Harmonizing the Nordic Regulation of Electricity Distribution

Regulators for electricity network infrastructure, such as electricity distribution system operations (DSO) face some particular challenges in the Nordic countries. Due to institutional, economic and historical reasons the DSOs in the Nordic area are relatively numerous and heterogeneous in terms of ownership structure, size and operating conditions. Since the deregulation in 1994-1999, the national regulators have independently devised regulation mechanisms that address the heterogeneity through econometric or engineering cost models as a basis for high- powered regimes. The frontier analysis models (such as Data Envelopment Analysis in e.g. Norway and Finland) are particularly useful here, given their incentive properties and cautious estimation of the production set. However, the total information rents in yardstick regimes and the bias in the frontier estimation are related to the number of observations (firms), which undermine their future application in the Nordic area under increasing interregional concentration. This paper develops a proposal for an alternative model, the revenue-yardstick model, that can be ap- plied across the national regulations and permit frontier estimations on final user cost rather than cost estimates, sensitive to e.g. capital cost estimates, periodisation and allocation keys. The core of the model is a dynamic frontier yardstick model such as Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind (2005), but here applied only to strictly exogenous conditions, the output dimensions and the claimed revenues of the DSO. An equilibrium is implemented using asymmetric penalties for positive and negative deviations from the ex post frontier revenue, the yardstick, using the classic superefficiency model in analogy with Shleifer (1985). The model is particularly aimed at an international (interregional) application as it may embed national differences in regulation without jeopardizing the long-term sustainability of the model

Endogenous Common Weights as a Collusive Instrument in Frontier-Based Regulation

Non-parametric efficiency analysis, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) relies so far on endogenous local or exogenous general weights, based on revealed preferences or market prices. However, as DEA is gaining popularity in regulation and normative budgeting, the strategic interest of the evaluated industry calls for attention. We offer endogenous general prices based on a reformulation of DEA where the units collectively propose the set of weights that maximize their efficiency. Thus, the sector-wide efficiency is then a result of compromising the scores of more specialized smaller units, which also gives a more stable set of weights. The potential application could be to precipitate collective bargaining on cost efficiency under regulation with asymmetric information on relative prices and costs. The models are applied to paneldata from 285 Danish district heating plants, where the open evaluation of multiple non-priced outputs is relevant. The results show that sector wide weighting schemes favor input/output combinations that are less variable than would individual units